The distribution function of the time between false alarms which results from combining the output of two independent sensors in an AND-logic mode is derived. In particular, the false alarms'!from each sensor are assumed to be distributed according to Poisson laws (Xj and X2). A "moving window" with a I ( ) time intervalvt is used such that an alarm for the combined system is triggered if, and only if, an alarm from each system occurs within an interval -t. Numerical results of using the derived distribution in combination with a simplified detection model are presented for a number of cases.a.
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INTRODUCTION
Present day peripheral detection systems exhibit high probabilities of intruder detection. Unfortunately, this improved detection performance may often be accompanied by a significant increase in false alarm rate. For an installation with a number of these devices deployed on its periphery, the total rate produced during certain periods of operation can impose a severe burden on the alarm processing function as well as result in degraded response force performance. The purpose of this discussion is to examine analytically an approach to the false alarm problem which does not involve extensive modification of current devices and systems. This approach consists of combining the output of two sensors using AND-logic.
SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS OF PERIPHERAL SENSORS
The typical detection device produces a voltage signal as a function of time. Alarms are triggered when the voltage exceeds a given threshold which is chosen to produce the desired probability of detection. Figure 1 shows a possible time history produced by the sensor. Signals produced by an intrusion are indicated at times t 1 and t 2 . If the threshold is set at V I , the decision logic will trigger an alarm at time t 2 ; but, the signal at time t 1 will fail to produce an alarm. If the threshold is set at V 2 1 both intrusion signals will produce alarms; but, the peak shown at time t 3 which is the result of noise in the system, will also produce an alarm. Thus, lowering the threshold leads to more valid alarms and also increases the probability of false alarms. In general, false alarm rate,X , and detection probability, Pd, are related quantities: increasing the probability of detection generally leads to higher false alarm rates and lowering false alarm rates leads to decreased probability of detection. Figure  2 shows the typical relationship between the detection probability and false alarm rates as a function of threshold setting.
The detection performance of individual sensors is affected by a number of factors. Sensors will perform differently, in different environments. Buried sensors will have different responses in frozen ground, snow cover and various soil conditions.
Above ground sensors will be affected by rain, fog and other effects. Intruders will exhibit different sizes, knowledge and modes of approach, and they will move at different velocities (this is a key factor in combined system performance).
Finally,
Pd is a function of range from the sensor.
Even more important are the individual sensor characteristics. vehicular traffic) and internally generated noise. The alarms from two different sensors may also be highly correlated. Thus, two fence sensors in the same vicinity will be affected by the same gusts of wind. Thunder could similarly trigger correlated alarms in acoustic sensors. In addition, nuisance alarms can be produced by the wild-life inhabiting certain areas.
It should also be pointed out that the false alarm rate at a given location is not a constant through all time. There may be significant diurnal variations due to changes in the environment such as the ebb and flow of vehicular traffic or industrial activity in the area. The occurrence of storms is also a factor in this variation. Table 1 is a summary of the detection and false alarm characteristics of the devices under consideration.
FALSE ALARM REDUCTION
Several approaches are possible for the false alarm reduction problem. One of these is to install a more sophisticated decision process in the logic of the detection device. As stated above, the current alarm/no alarm decision procedure is based on simple thresholding. False alarms arising from specific disturbances such as thunder could, in principle, be filtered out of the system by processing the waveforms associated with them. That is, the characteristic waveforms associated with various kinds of disturbances could be used in a cross-correlation (or other pattern recognition) mode to permit classification of the source of the disturbance. Such an approach involves a systematic examination of the ensemble of waveforms associated with the phenomena in order to generate the algorithm or logic necessary for the decision process. Referring to Figure 1 , it would be necessary to isolate the cause of the peal at time t 3 and to examine the time history of that transient in the system. By analyzing the characteristics of this ensemble a filter could be constructed which allows identification of a particular set of disturbances. The success of such an approach is problematical in that sufficient data have not been scrutinized at this point to establish the degree of uniqueness of the waveforms associated with actual intrusions. Thus, it is not clear to what extent a transient due to wind acting on a fence sensor is different from that produced by an intruder. In any case, the performance of such an analysis would require extensive data collection of the waveforms and their associated causes. At present, the decision process resides in the device that yields the alarm/no alarm decision. Thus, the information available is of a binary go/no-go nature since the decision is made by thresholding.
Another possible approach is the implementation of a stochastic threshold V 0 (t) which is a function of time and background conditions. The classical Wiener spectrum method does not apply here since the statistics of the background noise are not stationary. Much work has been done in recent years, however, which applies to adaptive thresholding in the presence of nonstationary noise (References 1 through 3).
A third approach is to use two or more devices in an area tracking mode. By logically processing the times and locations of the alarms, an attempt could be made to establish a track associated with a given intrusion. Failure to establish a track would indicate that no intrusion had, in fact, taken place and that certain of the alarms were spurious.
A fourth approach to false alarm reduction and the one examined in detail in this report is to use two devices in a modified tracking mode. This approach has the advantage of not requiring modification of existing detection devices. It does not involve changing the threshold method for alarm decisions. Rather, it would process the output of two devices and perform a decision function exterior to both devices.
The case considered will be that of two coincident generically different sensors. The alarm output of each device is monitored 9 and the time between an alarm from system S i and the first subsequent alarm from system Si (i f j) is computed. If that time is greater than a threshold , the system does not react. If the interval between alarms from each system is less than ', the system reacts and an alarm is triggered. The parameter Tis chosen based on the detection characteristics of S 1 and S 2 . The rationale fo r choosing't'will be discussed later in the report. The reason for deploying generically different sensors is that false alarms are less likely to be correlated in this case. In summary, the decision logic consists of deciding a system alarm if, and only if, at least one alarm occurs from each sensor during an interval I.
In the remainder of this report, the analytics of the system logic and numerical examples will be presented.
Of particular interest will be a comparison of the average time between alarms for the combined system and that for the systems Sit and S2* Another quantity of interest is the time between alarms that corresponds to, say, the 95-percentile level. That is, the time between alarms such that 95% of the intervals are greater than it.
ANALYTICAL MODEL
The first topic that will be discussed here is the derivation of the probability density function of the time t between system alarms for the case of coincident sensors. To achieve a model which is relatively simple, the following assumptions will be made. First it will be assumed that there are no delays in communicating alarms to the decision processor. Further, there is no back-out time after a detection. The false alarms in S are assumed to obey a Poisson distribution with rate 1' and those in S2 with rate h 2" The derivation of the density function of t I the time to false alarm in the combined system, will proceed on a step-by-step basis. Consider, first, the situation when the system is turned on at time zero. An interval of time t 1 elapses before an alarm from S 1 appears and an interval t 2 , before an alarm from S 2 . The joint probability density of t 1 and t is:
2 e1t1 e2t2.
At this point there are two possibilities: t < t 2 or t I > t 2 .
With AND-logic in operation, the combined system will be alarmed if t 2 -t 1 <T and t 2 > tl;
or if, t 2 < t I and t -t2<
To obtain the density function of the time t to system alarm, the function j(tl, t 2 ) must be integrated over the appropriate interval. For the case t I < t 2 , Figure 3 shows the region of integration associated with the density function. The interval I(t 2 ) over which j(tl,t 2 ) must be integrated is indicated by arrows.
Notice that the limits of the interval depend on whether t is 2 less than or greater than . When t 2 < T, the interval is O < t 1 < t 2 and when t 2 >_, the interval is t 2 -T < t < t 2 .
The same arguement holds, mutatis mutandis, for the case where t 2 < t . Performing the integrations yields the density function of waiting time, given that the event occurs on the first pass as: 
t2<'~)
On the first step of the prooess: t = The above analysis has shown the derivation of the start of the process. Each step of the succeeding process is essentially a repetition of a similar procedure. The point here is that the sequence may be segmented into intervals such that the analysis for each segment is identical. The distribution of waiting time is, then, the convolution of these intervals.
Reference to Figure 4 shows a schematic of the relation of times of alarms from S 1 and S2 . Figure 4 shows the case where the criterion has not been met and the last system to fail is S Figure 4a illustrates the case were the time of the next alarm from S 1 is greater than that from S The marginal density of t 2 for the case when the criterion is met is:
The marginal density in the case of failure to meet the criterion is: g*(t 2 ) = 2 e -Xt2e -2T
Similarly, Figure 4b illustrates the case when the next alarm from S 1 occurs sooner than that from S 2 . The expressions for g(t I ) and g*(t 1 ) are similar. Note that when the criterion fails as in Figure 4a , the interval must be added to the accrued waiting time, and, when the criterion is met as in Figure 4b , the quantityr must be added. Otherwise, the total waiting time is the sum of exponential variates with parameter = When the analysis is carried to completion, the calculation of the density function of waiting time may be formulated as follows. The density function of the sum of j exponential variates is given by: 
I -2 A2r
The functions that explicitly involve t are then written as:
For k NI,
n=0(
and
The partial densities are then defined as:
Finally, the density function of waiting time can be written as:
where Ilxi is the greatest integer not exceeding x.
The function h(t) can be used to calculate the average or expected waiting time. This is given by:
Figure 5 is a plot of E(t) versus A, for the special case of A 1 A 2 and for a variety of 7's. Also shown on the same plot is the expected waiting time when either system S1 or S 2 is used alone.
Figure 6 is a plot of the cumulative distribution function H(t) when X. 1 =2/hr, X2 -10/hr, and*Y -0.5 min. From this curve it is possible to determine the probability that the waiting time will be less than a given value. For example, if the minimum allowable time, due to operational and other constraints, is 0.2 h-, the curve shows that, for this combination of A I , X. and'7, the probability is 0.05 that the waiting time will be less than this.
Thus far, the analysis has dealt with the effect of the use of the "moving window" 7 on the time between alarms. The subject of the resultant probability of detection must now be addressed.
Associated with system Si is a conditional probability PDi which is the probability that an alarm is triggered, given that an intruder has passed through the detection zone of that system. The output of the two systems, S 1 and S 2 , can be combined to improve the net probability of detection or to lower the false alarm rate. For example, the decision procedure which declares an alarm when either system gives an alarm improves the probability of detection. For this procedure (commonly called OR-logic) the resulting probability of detection is: PD = I-(I-PDl) (1-PD2)"
The false alarm rate increases, however, and is given by N = A 1 + A 2 for the Poisson distribution false alarms discussed above.
The AND-logic under consideration requires that both S 1 and S 2 trigger an alarm in an intervalr tduring the passage of an intruder through the zone of detection. This requirement can be met if S 1 and S2 give valid alarms due to intruder passage within an interval t; or if either system gives an alarm which is preceded or followed by a false alarm from the other system. Let r be the probability that both systems give valid alarms within an interval Then the combined system probability of detection is:
The quantity j appearing in the expression corresponds to the probability that both S 1 and S2 give a false alarm within an interval ' during intruder passage time. To assess ( for any particular time of passage (a function of intruder average velocity and the width of the zone) the cumulative distribution function H(t) may be consulted. In general, the term may be neglected and the resulting expression for PD provides a convenient lower bound for the probability of detection.
In this connection it should be observed that, except in the case of very high false alarm rates, the use of AND-logic must lead to a lower combined system probability of detection than that which obtains when either system is used alone. Thus, the upper bond on I is:
This is the price that must be paid for a reduction in false alarm rate.
The crucial term entering into the calculation of PD is the probability that both systems trigger a valid alarm within an interval r.
To evaluate I , the characteristics of the sensing device as well as the relevant conditions of the intrusion must be used. Thus, most sensing devices are range-dependent, which means that they are more likely to trigger an alarm as the intruder comes nearer a subzone of the detection region. Also, some devices will have responses that are functions of intruder velocity. In any case, the time that the intruder dwells in the detection zone is an important factor.
To give substance to the above remarks, a simplified, but illuminating sensor model will be introduced. This will permit the calculation of numerical results which will illustrate some of the trade-offs between probability of detection and false alarm rate.
To characterize the performance of the sensors, define gl(sl) to be the density function of the probability of detection when the intruder has progressed to a point which is a distance s1 from Sensor 1 and let g 2 (s 2 ) be the corresponding density function for Sensor 2. Here, it is assumed that there is only one alarm per sensor during an intrusion. 
The operator of the detection system does not observe s directly, but rather, t, the time between detections. Let the average speed of the intruder between detections equal v. The density function of t is given by:
Thus, it becomes apparent that the density function of t is conditional upon the speed of the intruder as he passes through the zone of detection. The time window,?', must be chosen so that:
w1e;e ais an acceptably high probability of detection ( d PPd2).
The parameter v may be treated in a variety of ways. A conservative approach is to set v equal to the minimum velocity that poses a threat when the functioning of the entire system (that in which this detection subsystem is imbedded) is considered.
Another approach is to assume a distribution on v and to choose T based on the expected value of
That is, let p(v) be the density function of v, then:
For example, assume that v is uniformly distributed between v and vl, then
V
The total probability of detection for the combined case is P= E( ) + Pd(1-Pd) (l-e ' 2)+P (-P)
(1-e ).
It has been assumed in the above derivation that each sensor gives a single alarm. This was, of course, implicit in generating the density functions gi(si). In reality, a sensor could give a number of alarms during a given intrusion. Thus, the density g(s)
is not adequate for the most general situation. The following discussion will seek to elucidate this point.
It was assumed above that detection depended only on the distance of the intruder from a given zero reference line. As a consequence of this dependence, it was found that the width, V, of the time window was a function of the speed of the intruder. In general, however, the density function itself may also be a function of intruder speed. Moreover, multiple alarms can occur for a given sensor and intrusion. As was mentioned above, another figure of merit that may be used to assess the effect of combining two systems in an AND-logic mode is the waiting time corresponding to the 95 percentile. That is the time, tmin , such that the probability that the waiting time is greater than tmin is 0.95. The parameter tmi n becomes particularly significant in the case of an installation consisting of numerous zones of detection. There, the parameter tmin has an important bearing on the assessment time between alarms. If there are n statistically independent zones, then the distribution of the time between alarms is given by G(t)n where H(t) is the cumulative distribution function of the time between alarms for a single zone. Figure 10 is a plot of tmin versus n for = 0.5/min., )k2 = 2/min and = 0.3 sec.
To establish a trade-off for the case of n zones, it is necessary to synthesize the results concerning tmin (Figure 10) and those concerning the probability of detection using the 
so4nuTw
UTUT common 2-dependence. Figure 11 shows plots of Pd versus tmi n for n = 1,2 and 10. From the plot for n = 10, it is seen that when tmi n = 0.5 min the system Pd is 0.9. For this case, the average time between alarms for the combined system is approximately 10 minutes. If S ( A 1 = 0.5) were used alone in each of the ten zones, the average time between alarms would be 12 seconds. Moreover, tmin would be equal to 0.6 seconds as against the 0.5 min. when the combined system is used.
SUIMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The numerical example presented above indicates that substantial improvement in the false alarm behavior of peripheral detectors may be achieved by combining two such detectors in an AND-logic mode. It should be emphasized that the detection model used in that example permitted only one detection per sensor during an intrusion. Realistic sensors will not ha-,e this limitation and therefore, the predicted detection probability performance is conservative.
To definitively assess the value of a combined system the characteristics of actual sensors must be embodied in the detection model. This includes the false alarm behavior (which may or may not be Poisson) as well as communication delays and lockout times. When all of these factors are included, the best approach to an evaluation of the combined system is probably a Monte Carlo simulation. This will be particularly true if detailed examination of actual false alarm data reveals that the statistics of these data do not obey a law that is amenable to analytic manipulation.
